The following table provides more information about interest laws in Minnesota and usury laws and restrictions on credit card interest rates. Note: State laws can always change, whether due to new laws, case law, or voting initiatives. We strive to ensure the accuracy of these pages, but you can also contact a consumer protection attorney in Minnesota or do your own legal research to review the state laws you are looking for. In addition, we observe the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which addresses the nature of subsection 3a and the powers of the Attorney General under section 8.31. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the attorney general has «broader» remedies than a private litigant and that «the right of a private litigant to file a complaint under section 3a is part of the broader authority of the state attorney general to bring a lawsuit under section 3 to enforce all remedies available to him. including the corrective measures referred to in subsection 3a. Curtis, 813 N.W.2d to 899; see Ly, 615 N.W.2d, p. 313. In Curtis, the Supreme Court held: «In Minn. Stat. § 8.31, State AG has the right to bring an action on behalf of the State under paragraph 3 and to seek not only the remedy available to State AG under paragraph 3, but also the remedy available to a private party to the proceedings under Article 3a.» Curtis, 813 N.W.2d at 900-01. This is a permanent right.

Our interpretation of subsection 3a discussed above is consistent with the Supreme Court`s finding that the Attorney General has «broad and broad powers.» Id., p. 898. Although the authority of a private plaintiff under the law derives from the authority of the Attorney General, «the remedies available to State AG are broader than those available to a private litigant.» Id., p. 899; see Ly, 615 N.W.2d, at p. 313 («[T]he impetus of the law cannot go beyond the source of its authority—that of the Attorney General.»). Paragraph 3a does not limit the remedies available to the Attorney General for breaches of the public interest, but rather expands the remedies available to private applicants. This is also a permanent right. The State also contends that the District Court misapplied section 56.19 to prevent full compensation for student debtors. Respondents say the state is prohibited from asking for credit cards and that loans from national banks are not subject to Minnesota`s usury laws. In Marquette National Bank v. First, the court ruled that federal law overrides state law and allows a national bank to charge «interest on each loan» at the rate permitted by the laws of the state «in which the bank is located.» As a result, Minnesota`s usury laws do not apply to domestic banks located in a state that allows a higher interest rate.

The District Court argued that, since subsection 3 empowers the Attorney General to seek an injunction for violations of «laws referred to in subsection 1, in particular and in general», while subsection 3a is limited to «one of the laws referred to in subsection 1», allowing the Attorney General to seek remedies under subsection 3a would render the wording of subsection 3 superfluous. Since «Chapter 56 is not expressly referred to in subsection 1 of Article 8.31 of the State of Minnesota», the District Court held that the State did not have the authority to avail itself of the remedies provided for in subsection 3a. The Regional Court did not address the last sentence of paragraph 3a. However, the District Court found that Attorney General Parens Patriae had the power to seek a fair remedy for the student debtors concerned.5 The State argues that the District Court misinterpreted Article 8.31 as precluding it from «seeking an injunction. because [Chapter 56] was not explicitly cited in subsection 1 of Article 8.31. The state also asserts that the District Court`s interpretation «contradicts the plain language of Article 8.31 and impedes the enforcement of key consumer protection laws.» The defendants agree with the District Court`s legal interpretation and argue that the State cannot appeal under paragraph 3a of that Act because Chapter 56 is not expressly mentioned in Article 8.31(1). The statement states that the schools did not deny «that they were engaged in lending activity» within the meaning of the Licensing Act. It appears, therefore, that the schools did not attempt to argue that in providing loans to students to finance tuition, they were not acting as lenders who subject «loans» to Minnesota`s General Usury Act, but rather acted as sellers of goods or services that made loans to buyers to whom the on-time price doctrine applies.