Amended Rule 52(a)(5) contains provisions that were contained in former Rules 52(a) and (b). Article 52(a) provided that requests for findings were not necessary for the purposes of examination. It applied both to an action without a jury and to the issuance or rejection of an injunction. Section 52 (b), applicable to submissions «made in applications considered without a jury», provides that the sufficiency of the evidence «may subsequently be called into question as to whether the party asking the question objected to the submissions in the District Court, requested that they be varied or that partial submissions be sought». Former Rule 52(b) did not expressly apply to decisions granting or denying an injunction. Amended Rule 52(a)(5) makes explicit the application of this part of former Rule 52(b) to interim injunctions. For examples of harmonizing the review of findings of fact in cases heard without a jury with the review before the law as conducted in several states, see Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 190, 215 (1937). (2) For an interim injunction.

Similarly, when issuing or rejecting an injunction, the court must set out the findings and conclusions that support its actions. The finding and determination requirement under Rule 52(c) applies to all cases brought in the district and municipal courts of Boston governed by the Massachusetts Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., «matters traditionally considered to be tort, contract, relevin, or equity, except small claims actions.» Rule 81(a)(2). As a general rule, or in the reporter`s notes, no attempt was made to list all sorts of actions taken by the District Court and the Boston City Court that do not require findings and decisions. The supplementary procedure is an example where findings and decisions should not be necessary, as a supplementary procedure is a statutory procedure that does not fall within the scope of cases «traditionally regarded as tort, contract, defence or equity». Commentators also disagree on the correct interpretation of the article. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 769–70 (1957) (the wording and intent of the rule support the view that the «clearly erroneous» test should apply to all forms of evidence), and 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §2587, 740 (1971), with 5A J. Moore, Federal Practice 52.04, 2687–88 (2nd edition 1982) (The written rule supports a broader review of the results based on the testimony of witnesses without conduct).

Former rule 52 (c) provided for a decision on partial findings and called them a «decision on a point of law». The amended rule 52(c) refers only to «judgment» to avoid confusion with a judgment rendered under rule 50 as a point of law in a jury trial. The standards that apply to the verdict as a point of law in a jury trial have no bearing on a decision rendered under rule 52(c). Litigators are usually facilitated to avoid the complications associated with preparing and debating a jury indictment. But replacing it in a court case – findings of fact and legal findings – can be just as annoying. If they are well prepared and deployed, they can show you the way to victory and help you preserve it in the appeal process. See [former] Fairness Rule 701/2, as amended November 25, 1935 (Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusions) and U.S.C., Title 28, [formerly] § 764 (Opinions, Findings and Conclusions in Actions Against the United States), which are substantially maintained in this rule. The provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code, [formerly] §§ 773 (Trial of Questions of Fact; by Trial) and [formerly] 875 (Review in Cases Heard Without a Jury) are superseded to the extent that they provide for a different method of establishing facts and a different method of appellate review. The rule referred to in the third sentence of subparagraph (a) is consistent with decisions on the scope of review in modern federal capital practice. It applies to all categories of submissions in cases heard without a jury, whether it is a fact on which there was a witness contradiction or a fact derived from or derived from uncontradicted witness statements.

See Silver King Coalition Mines, Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 204 Fed. 166 (C.C.A.8th, 1913), cert. 229 U.S. 624 (1913); Warren v. Keep, 155 U.S. 265 (1894); Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U.S. 132 (1892); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 149 (1888); Kimberly v.

Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889). Compare Kaeser & Blair, Inc., v. Merchants` Ass`n, 64 F.(2d) 575, 576 (C.C.A.6th, 1933); Dunn v. Trefry, 260 Fed. 147, 148 (C.C.A.1st, 1919). In Massachusetts, the findings of a confirmed main report were binding on the court unless they were «mutually inconsistent or clearly erroneous.» Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259, 260 (1964); Luke v. Leventhal, 344 Mass. 762 (1962). Some courts of appeal have stated that if the findings of a trial court are not based on the conduct and assessment of a witness`s credibility, there is no reason to abide by the findings of the trial court, and the court of appeal can more easily view them as manifestly erroneous.

See, for example, Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 144–45 (5th Cir. 1980). Others go even further and consider that the appellate review can be carried out without applying the «manifestly erroneous» test, since the Court of Appeal is as well as the trial judge capable of reviewing a purely documentary record. See, for example, Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

880 (1982); Lydle v. United States, 635 F.2d 763, 765 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1981); Swanson v. Baker Indus., Inc., 615 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1980); Taylor c. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.